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Abstract. We study the coupled dynamics of two populations of random replicators by means of statis-
tical mechanics methods, and focus on the effects of relative population size, strategy correlations and
heterogeneities in the respective co-operation pressures. To this end we generalise existing path-integral
approaches to replicator systems with random asymmetric couplings. This technique allows one to formu-
late an effective dynamical theory, which is exact in the thermodynamic limit and which can be solve for
persistent order parameters in a fixed-point regime regardless of the symmetry of the interactions. The
onset of instability can be determined self-consistently. We calculate quantities such as the diversity of the
respective populations and their fitnesses in the stationary state, and compare results with data from a
numerical integration of the replicator equations.
PACS. 02.50.Le, 75.10.Nr, 87.23.Kg
1 Introduction
The evolutionary dynamics of populations of interacting
species is often described by so-called replicator equa-
tions (RE) [1,2]. Each species here carries a fitness, and
species who are fitter than the average increase in con-
centration whereas the weight of species less fit than av-
erage decreases. RE have also found applications in game
theory and economics [3], and an equivalence to Lotka-
Volterra equations of population dynamics can be estab-
lished. In the context of game theory RE describe situ-
ations in which a game is played repeatedly by players
chosen randomly from populations of agents. Each indi-
vidual agent here plays one fixed (so-called pure) strategy
throughout his lifetime, and reproduction occurs in pro-
portion to the payoff accrued. Offspring then inherit the
strategy of their parent. In this situation the replicators
are hence the pure strategies of the game under consider-
ation. In this paper we will use the interpretations of RE
in population dynamics and in evolutionary game theory
simultaneously, and will hence refer to the replicating en-
tities as ‘species’ and ‘strategies’ synonymously. Similarly,
‘fitness’ and ‘payoff’ will be used interchangeably.
The analysis of eco-systems and replicators with fixed
random couplings was initiated by the seminal work of [4],
and although the study of real-world eco-systems has since
then moved on the incorporate more realistic and evolv-
ing networks (see e.g. [5] and references therein), replicator
systems with quenched random couplings are still of inter-
est from the statistical mechanics perspective and as an
analytically tractable benchmark. Techniques from disor-
dered systems theory have first been applied to such mod-
els in [6,7,8,9] and focus both on static approaches based
on the replica method and on dynamical studies by means
of generating functional techniques. The latter approach
here has the advantage of being able to address couplings
of general symmetry [7,10], whereas replica theory is re-
stricted to cases of symmetric interaction (see [11,12,13,
14,15,16] for further replica studies of random replicator
models). In the course of these studies complex non-trivial
behaviour of random replicator systems has been identi-
fied, with several types of phase transitions between stable
and unstable regimes, and multiple patterns of ergodicity
breaking. While most of the existing studies have focused
on so-called single-population models, corresponding to
games with only one type of player, multi-population mod-
els have recently been addressed in [17], where a relation
between the stability of two-population replicator systems
and the corresponding two-player bi-matrix games has
been considered. These are games in which the two in-
teracting players take different roles (e.g. female versus
male), and may hence have different sets of strategies at
their disposal (as opposed to single-population games such
as rock-papers-scissors, where the strategy pool is iden-
tical for both players). Static studies of random matrix
games can also be found in [18,19,20].
The aim of the present work is to extend the studies of
[17] to the case of two interacting populations of different
relative size and to incorporate correlations between pay-
off matrices as well as heterogeneity in the co-operation
pressures of species. We first present the details of the
model in the next section, and then formulate an effective
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macroscopic theory in the thermodynamic limit. Specific
results are then reported in section 4, where we test the
predictions of the resulting fixed-point theory against nu-
merical simulations. A summary and outlook conclude the
paper.
2 Model
We consider two populations of replicators (abbreviated as
P1 and P2 in the following), where we denote the species
in system P1 by i = 1, . . . , N1, and the ones in population
P2 by j = 1, . . . , N2. N1 and N2 are hence the sizes of the
two populations (equivalently the number of pure strate-
gies available to the two types of players of the bi-matrix
game). We will consider the general case N1 6= N2, and
will write N1 = αN and N2 = α2N in the following. The
statistical mechanics analysis is then concerned with the
limit N,N1, N2 → ∞, where the ratios α1 = N1/N and
α2 = N2/N remain finite. The aspect ratio α = α1/α2 is
hence a control parameter of the model.
We will refer to the species in P1 as species of type X ,
and to species in P2 as species of type Y . The composition
of P1 at time t is then characterised by a concentration
vector (x1(t), . . . , xN1(t)), where xi indicates the relative
weight of species i in P1. Similarly, the configuration of P2
can be described by (y1(t), . . . , yN2(t)). In the context of
evolutionary game theory, vectors of this type characterise
mixed strategies [3], with e.g. yj being proportional to the
probability of a player of type Y using pure strategy j ∈
{1, . . . , N2}. We will in the following use the normalisation
N−11
∑
i xi = 1 and N
−1
2
∑
j yj = 1, which will allow us
to formulate a well-defined thermodynamic limit of the
problem.
Species of type X are assumed to interact only with
species of type Y and vice versa, and the populations are
taken to follow the following replicator equations
x˙i = xi

−2u1xi + N1∑
j=1
aijyj − f1

 ,
y˙j = yj
(
−2u2yj +
N2∑
i=1
bjixi − f2
)
. (1)
u1 and u2 are here the co-operation pressures acting on
the two populations. Depending on their strengths u1 and
u2 limit the growth of individual species and drive P1
and P2 towards states with many surviving species and
high diversity [2]. We will mostly consider the situation
in which u1, u2 ≥ 0. The payoff matrices (or inter-species
couplings) {aij , bji} are drawn from a Gaussian distribu-
tion with the following first two moments:
aij = bji = 0,
a2ij = b
2
ji =
1
N ,
aijbji =
Γ
N . (2)
The overbar denotes an average over the disorder, i.e. over
samples of the random payoff matrices. All other covari-
ances are taken to vanish. The scaling of the covariance
matrix with the system size N is here again chosen to
guarantee a well-defined thermodynamic limit N → ∞,
with which the statistical mechanics theory will be con-
cerned. Γ ∈ [−1, 1] is a model parameter, characterising
the symmetry or otherwise of the interaction: for Γ = −1
we have aij = −bji corresponding to prey-predator rela-
tions in population dynamics, and to a zero-sum game in
the context of evolutionary game theory. For Γ = 0 aij
and bji are uncorrelated, while Γ = 1 corresponds to the
case of symmetric interaction, aij = bji. Intermediate val-
ues of Γ allow for a smooth interpolation between these
cases. f1 and f2 finally are the time-dependent mean fit-
nesses of species in the two respective populations,
f1 = N
−1
1
N1∑
i=1
xif
(1)
i
f2 = N
−1
2
N2∑
j=1
yjf
(2)
j , (3)
where f
(1)
i = −2u1xi +
∑
j aijyj denotes the fitness of
species i (the superscript indicates that this species be-
longs to P1). f
(2)
j is defined similarly. These definitions
ensure that the replicator equations (1) conserve the nor-
malisations N−11
∑N1
i=1 xi = N
−1
2
∑
j yj = 1 in time. Ini-
tial conditions in our simulations are chosen to respect
this normalisation.
3 Statistical mechanics theory
3.1 Uncorrelated strategies
The dynamics of the model can be reduced to two coupled
stochastic processes for a representative pair of ‘effective’
species, one from each population. We will not detail the
mathematical steps here, but will only quote the final out-
come. Similar calculations can be found in [7,10] or, in
a different context, in the textbook [21]. The generating
functional analysis delivers the following effective dynam-
ics:
x˙(t) = x(t)
[
− 2u1x(t) + Γα2
∫
dt′G2(t, t
′)x(t′) + η1(t)− f1(t)
]
,
y˙(t) = y(t)
[
− 2u2y(t) + Γα1
∫
dt′G1(t, t
′)y(t′) + η2(t)− f2(t)
]
,
(4)
where η1(t) and η2(t) represent coloured Gaussian noise
of zero mean and with covariances to be determined self-
consistently as
〈η1(t)η1(t′)〉 = α2 〈y(t)y(t′)〉 ,
〈η2(t)η2(t′)〉 = α1 〈x(t)x(t′)〉 ,
〈η1(t)η2(t′)〉 = 0. (5)
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〈·〉 here refers to an average over realisations of the effec-
tive processes, i.e. over paths of η1(t), η2(t). The response
functions G1(t, t
′) and G2(t, t′), in turn, are given by
G1(t, t
′) =
〈
δx(t)
δη1(t′)
〉
,
G2(t, t
′) =
〈
δy(t)
δη2(t′)
〉
(6)
respectively. As usual in the dynamics of disordered sys-
tems these processes are non-Markovian (as reflected by
the retarded interaction terms), and the resulting single-
particle noises {η1(t), η2(t)} exhibit non-trivial temporal
correlations. The description in terms of the above effec-
tive processes is equivalent to the original problem in the
thermodynamic limit in the sense that combined disorder-
species-averages in the microscopic problem can be eval-
uated as averages over realisations of the effective single-
particle noise (see [21] for further technical details regard-
ing the generating functional technique).
Following [7], we proceed with a fixed-point analysis
of (4), based on the assumption of time-translation invari-
ance and finite integrated responses
χn = lim
t→∞
∫ ∞
0
dτGn(t+ τ, t) <∞ (7)
(n = 1, 2). We also write q1 =
〈
x2
〉
and q2 =
〈
y2
〉
,
where x and y denote the fixed point values of the single-
species concentrations obtained from (4) as t→∞. Since
each realisation of the single-species trajectories is a time-
dependent stochastic process, the resulting fixed point val-
ues x and y are static random variables. See [7,10] for
further technical details regarding this approach.
The fixed-point ansatz then leads to the following six
equations for the persistent order parameters
{q1, q2, χ1, χ2, f1, f2}:
χ1(2u1 − α2Γχ2) = g0(∆1),
χ2(2u2 − α1Γχ1) = g0(∆2),
(α2q2)
−1/2(2u1 − α2Γχ2) = g1(∆1),
(α1q1)
−1/2(2u2 − α1Γχ1) = g1(∆2),
q1/(α2q2)(2u1 − α2Γχ2)2 = g2(∆1),
q2/(α1q1)(2u2 − α1Γχ1)2 = g2(∆2), (8)
where ∆1 = −f1/√α2q2 and ∆2 = −f2/√α1q1 and where
gk(∆) =
∫∆
−∞
dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2(∆ − z)k for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. These
equations are readily solved to yield the persistent order
parameters {q1, q2, χ1, χ2, f1, f2} as functions of the model
parameters {u1, u2, α1, α2, Γ}. It is here efficient to pro-
ceed as proposed in [15] and to obtain parametric solutions
in terms of {∆1, ∆2}, i.e. to fix the values of these two
quantities, and then to obtain {q1, q2, χ1, χ2, u1, u2} from
the left-hand sides of (8). Note that φ1 ≡ g0(∆1) and φ2 ≡
g0(∆2) are the fractions of surviving species, in the two re-
spective populations. In the context of game theory these
expressions correspond to the fractions of pure strategies
played with non-zero probabilities [18,19,20]. As seen in
[10] 1/q1 and 1/q2 serve as measures of the resulting di-
versities as well. q1 is here given by q1 = N
−1
1
∑
i x
2
i at
the fixed point, and a similar definition of q2 applies. If
e.g. all species are present at equal concentration xi = 1
in P1 (i = 1, . . . , N1), then 1/q1 = 1. If however only a
few species survive in P1, then 1/q1 → 0 (in the extreme
case of only one species surviving, say x1 = N1 and xi = 0
for i > 1 one has q1 = N1 which tends to infinity in the
thermodynamic limit). A detailed inspection shows that
1/q1 and 1/q2 are closely related to what is referred to
Simpson’s index of diversity in ecology [22].
3.2 Correlated strategies
We will below also consider the case of correlated strate-
gies as proposed in [18,19]. Here, the moments of the ma-
trix elements {aij , bji} are further constrained by impos-
ing
aijakj =
c1
N
1
N
,
aikajk =
c2
N
1
N
, (9)
with correlation parameters c1, c2 ≥ 0. We will further-
more restrict the analysis to the case Γ = −1 when con-
sidering strategy correlations, we then have bji = −aij . c1
and c2 measure the correlations within rows and columns
of the payoff matrix. I.e. if c2 is large, the elements
a1j , a2j, a3j , . . . , aN1j bear some correlation for any fixed
j, reflecting a reduction of the variability of strategies in
P1 (all pure strategies i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N1 in P1 bear some
degree of similarity). Similarly, an increased value of c1
makes pure strategies in P2 more alike, and hence reduces
the strategic options of individuals in that population.
These strategy correlations can be incorporated in the
path-integral analysis, and lead to the following modifica-
tions in the resulting effective processes:
x˙ = x
[
− 2u1x−
∫
dt′G2(t, t
′)(x(t′) + c2) + η1(t)− f1(t)
]
,
y˙ = y
[
− 2u2y −
∫
dt′G1(t, t
′)(y(t′) + c1) + η2(t)− f2(t)
]
.
(10)
The covariances of the effective single-species noises are
now given by
〈η1(t)η1(t′)〉 = 〈y(t)y(t′)〉+ c1,
〈η2(t)η2(t′)〉 = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉+ c2, (11)
and 〈η1(t)η2(t′)〉 = 0 as before. The resulting equations for
the persistent order parameters undergo the correspond-
ing changes as well (we do not report them here).
3.3 Stability
The stability of the fixed point identified and used in the
above ansatz can be investigated by means of a linear
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Fig. 1. (Colour on-line) Phase diagram of the model with two
co-operation pressures u1 and u2 (α1 = α2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0).
The lines show the onset of instability, with the stable phase
above the respective lines. Phase boundaries are shown for Γ =
1, 0.5, 0,−0.5 from top to bottom.
expansion about the assumed fixed point values of the
concentrations of the effective pure strategy frequencies x
and y and of the stationary noise variables η1 and η2. We
will not go into details here, as the analysis follows the
lines of [7]. The final outcome is that the system is stable
whenever
φ1
χ21
φ2
χ22
> α1α2, (12)
and that non-trivial and non-decaying fluctuations may
arise whenever this condition is violated, so that the above
fixed-point ansatz breaks down and Eqs. (8) can no longer
be expected to describe the behaviour of the model accu-
rately. For α1 = α2 = 1 the above condition reduces to
the one reported in [17]. We also remark that, if addition-
ally u1 = u2 ≡ u, Eqs. (8) reduce to the one-population
results of [7,10]. The onset of instability then occurs at
uc = (1 + Γ )/(2
√
2), as first reported in [7].
4 Results
4.1 Populations with different co-operation pressures
We first study the case of equally large populations, α1 =
α2 = 1, and focus on the effects of the co-operation pres-
sures u1 and u2 on the stability and behaviour of the sys-
tem. The resulting phase diagram has been reported in
[17], and is re-iterated in Fig. 1 for completeness. The
replicator dynamics, for any given realisation of the cou-
pling matrices, evolve into a unique stable fixed point
at large co-operation pressure. Below the phase transi-
tion lines depicted in Fig. 1, the system becomes non-
ergodic in the sense that multiple microscopic stationary
states exists, and initial conditions determine which of
these is assumed asymptotically. For fully symmetric cou-
plings Γ = 1 the system still evolves into a fixed point, but
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1/q1,2
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1/q1,2
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1/q1,2
Γ=1
Γ=0
Γ=−1
Fig. 2. (Colour on-line) Diversities 1/q1 and 1/q2 of the two
populations as a function of the co-operation pressure in pop-
ulation 2. u1 = 1 fixed (α1 = α2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0. Symbols are
from simulations for N = 100 (5000 integration steps, 10 sam-
ples), with black circles corresponding to 1/q1 and red squares
to 1/q2. Γ = 1, 0,−1 in the top, middle and bottom panel re-
spectively. Lines are from theory (solid in stable phase, dashed
in unstable regime).
exponentially many (in N) fixed points can be expected
to exist [6,7,8]. For Γ < 1, i.e. for systems with partially
or fully uncorrelated or anti-correlated couplings, no such
behaviour is observed, and the dynamics may evolve to-
wards a volatile, potentially chaotic state.
The role of the two co-operation pressures is to drive
the respective populations into the internal region of their
concentration simplices (defined by the constraints
N−11
∑N1
i=1 xi = 1 andN
−1
2
∑
j yj = 1). Hence co-operation
pressure promotes the survival of many pure strategies, or
in other words a diverse stationary state. In order to study
the effects of u1 and u2 we report results for a fixed value
u1 = 1 in Fig. 2 and depict results for the diversity param-
eters 1/q1 and 1/q2 of the respective populations, as u2 is
varied. As expected both diversities are increasing func-
tions of u2. The effect on population 2 is here much more
direct, but remarkably, for small values of u2 the diversity
of population 1 is a steep function of u2 as well, at least
for symmetric and asymmetric couplings. This indicates a
feedback from population 2 onto population 1: decreasing
the co-operation pressure on population 2 leads to deple-
tion in this population and this may then impact on the
diversity of the other population as well, even though u1
is kept constant.
In Figs. 3 and 4 we report on the fitness of the two
populations. One here has to distinguish between the con-
tributions of co-operation pressure and of the direct in-
teraction to the overall fitness. While the Lagrange pa-
rameters f1,2 entail the effects of co-operation pressures
as well, we study the fitnesses ν1 = N
−1
1
∑
ij xiaijyj and
ν2 = N
−1
2
∑
ji yjbjixi purely due to direct interaction in
Fig. 4. As shown in Fig. 3 an increase of u2 typically re-
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Fig. 3. (Colour on-line) Lagrange multipliers f1 and f2 of
the two populations as a function of the co-operation pressure
in population 2. u1 = 1 fixed (α1 = α2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0).
Simulation parameters, lines and symbols as in Fig. 2. Circles
are population 1, squares population 2.
duces f1 and f2, provided Γ ≥ 0, i.e. provided that there
is no degree of anti-correlation present in the coupling ma-
trices. Again the effects of a change in u2 are much more
pronounced in P2 than in P1, and f1 remains almost con-
stant except for a region at small values of u2. For negative
values of Γ the effect is quite different, as seen in the lower
panel of Fig. 3. While, as before, f2 is a decreasing func-
tion of u2, non-trivial behaviour is induced in population
1, and f1 is found to be increasing in u2, especially when
u2 small. This is the regime in which u2 strongly controls
the diversity of population 2, and a reduction of the di-
versity in P2 appears to impact negatively on the fitness
of P1.
In order to disentangle the effects of co-operation pres-
sure related contributions to the fitnesses, we study the
behaviour of νn = fn + 2unqn, n = 1, 2 in Fig. 4. For
positive strategy correlation, we find that both fitnesses
decrease as u2 in increased. The non-trivial behaviour at
negative strategy correlation remains, however, and ν1 is
found to be a non-monotonous function of u2, again sig-
nalling an indirect impact of the diversity of P2 on the
payoff of P1.
An interesting effect is observed for the case Γ = −1,
i.e. for full anti-correlation, see Fig. 5. In order to char-
acterise the behaviour of ν1,2, we have here extended the
range of the co-operation pressures to include small neg-
ative values of u2. In the zero-sum case Γ = −1 one has
ν1 = −ν2 by construction, and both fitnesses are found
to be non-monotonic functions of u2 at fixed co-operation
pressure in population 1. In particular a maximum of the
fitness of P2 is found as the co-operation pressure u2 is in-
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
ν1,2
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
u2
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
ν1,2
Γ=0.5
Γ=−0.5
Fig. 4. (Colour on-line) Mean fitness ν1 and ν2 of the two
populations as a function of the co-operation pressure in pop-
ulation 2. u1 = 1 fixed (α1 = α2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0). Simulation
parameters, lines and symbols as in Fig. 2, but Γ = −0.5, 0.5
are chosen here. Symbols are from simulations, N = 100 (5000
iteration steps, 20 samples) with circles marking the fitness of
population 1, squares the one of population 2.
creased, whereas the other population experiences a min-
imum in fitness under these conditions.1
4.2 Effects of relative population size
The effects of varying the relative system size of the two
populations are illustrated in Figs. 6 and 7. We here first
follow [18,19] and fix the size parameter α1 in the first
population, and vary the size of P2. As shown in Fig. 6, the
diversities of both populations decrease as α2 = N2/N is
increased. The effect is much stronger in P1 than in P2. In
Fig. 7 we depict the fitnesses ν1, ν2 of the the two popula-
tions for this case of rectangular payoff matrices α1 6= α2.
We find that, within our settings and for Γ ≥ 0, both
populations profit from reducing the aspect ratio α1/α2,
where the increase of fitness appears more pronounced
for P1 than for P2. Thus it appears it is the size of the
population with which a given species interacts, rather
than the size of its own population, which determines
the fitness of this given species. Inspection of the case
of full anti-correlation (lower panel in Fig. 7) shows that
the fitness of P1 may display non-monotonic behaviour
as a function of α2. We note here that ν1/ν2 = α2 for
the case of fully symmetric couplings (Γ = 1), and that
1 We here remark that while numerical experiments agree
near perfectly with the theoretical predictions for positive u2,
they become less reliable at u2 ≈ 0, where the theoretical
curves are fairly steep. The accuracy of simulations might here
suffer from a small number of surviving species and the asso-
ciated finite-size effects and sample-to-sample fluctuations.
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-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
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Fig. 5. (Colour on-line) Mean fitness ν1 and ν2 of the two
populations as a function of the co-operation pressure in pop-
ulation 2. u1 = 1 fixed. Simulation parameters, lines and sym-
bols as in Fig. 2, but Γ = −1. Symbols are from simulations,
N = 100 (5000 iteration steps, 200 samples) with circles mark-
ing the fitness of population 1, squares the one of population
2.
ν1/ν2 = −α2 for Γ = −1, i.e. for aij = −bji. These re-
lations are due to the construction of the model, where
one has ν1 = N
−1
1
∑
ij xiaijyj and ν2 = N
−1
2
∑
ji yjbjixi
as well as N1/N2 = α1/α2. No such simple relations be-
tween the resulting ν1, ν2 are found for −1 < Γ < 1, as
aij and bji are then neither fully correlated nor fully anti-
correlated.
The results described so far in this section are not
found to be symmetrical around α2 = 1, In a symmetri-
cal situation, where only the aspect ratio α1/α2 matters,
one would expect that choosing α2 = a is equivalent to
setting α2 = a
−1 for any a > 0, subject to a relabelling
of the two populations. Recall, however that the coupling
strengths a2ij = b
2
ji remain fixed and are given by 1/N .
The respective sizes of the two populations are N1 = α1N
and N2 = α2N , where we fixed N1 = N above. These def-
initions follow those of [18,19]. A more symmetrical setup
can be achieved by setting e.g. α1 =
√
α and α2 = 1/
√
α,
with 0 < α < 1 the aspect ratio α = α1/α2 = N1/N2.
As seen in Fig. 8, the diversity of population 1 decreases
as its relative size α is increases, whereas 1/q2 is mono-
tonically decreasing (we do not report simulation results
here to keep the figure readable). The behaviour of the
fitnesses crucially depends on the symmetry of couplings,
with multiple crossings of ν1 and ν2 observed for suitable
model parameters as shown in Fig. 8.
4.3 Strategy correlations
Finally, we have examined the effects of strategy corre-
lations. We here fix α1 = α2 = 1 and Γ = −1. Results
are presented in Fig. 9, where we depict the case of vary-
ing c2 at fixed c1 = 0. As seen in the figure, the diversity
(or equivalently the fraction of pure strategies played with
0 1 2 3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1/q1,2
0 1 2 3
0.6
0.8
1
1/q1,2
0 1 2 3
α2
0.8
1
1/q1,2
Fig. 6. (Colour on-line). Diversity parameters 1/q1 (circles)
and 1/q2 (squares) as the size α2 of P2 is varied (α1 = 1
remains fixed; u1 = u2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0). Simulations are for
N = 200, 20000 integration steps, 10 samples, solid lines are
from the theory. Γ = 1, 0,−1 from top to bottom.
non-zero probability) decreases in both populations as c2
is increased. The effect is stronger in P2 than in P1. At the
same time, the payoff for population two increases as the
correlation parameter c2 is increased, whereas the payoff
for P1 decreases (note that ν1 = −ν2 by construction, as
we are considering the case of zero-sum games, Γ = −1).
The condensation of P2 into a small subset of strategies
can here be understood as follows: an increased value of
c2 induces correlations within the columns of the payoff
matrix A = (aij), so that in the extreme case of large
c2 ≫ 1, the {aij}j=1,...,N become mostly independent of
i. Thus the payoff for both players becomes more and more
independent of the action of player X , and depends only
on the choice j of player Y . In other words, the strategies
available to player X become more and more alike as c2 is
increased, thus rendering some of Y ’s strategies generally
beneficial for Y (independently of the choice of X), and
others detrimental. Hence, Y will mostly play strategies
beneficial from his perspective and will reduce the diver-
sity 1/q2 of his actions, while at the same time increasing
his payoff ν2, as seen in Fig. 9. See also [18] for similar
cases. A more symmetrical situation can be constructed
by considering c1 = c2 = c, a case in which correlations are
present both in the rows and columns of the payoff matrix.
We do not depict results here, but only remark that in this
case the diversity of both populations decreases as c is in-
creased (the payoff for both populations remains strictly
zero in this case due to the zero-sum property of the games
considered, and the exchange symmetry between P1 and
P2).
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Fig. 7. (Colour on-line). Fitnesses ν1 (circles) and ν2 (squares)
of the two populations, as the size α2 of P2 is varied (α1 = 1
remains fixed; u1 = u2 = 1). Simulations are for N = 200,
20000 integration steps, 10 samples, solid lines are from the
theory. Γ = 1, 0,−1 from top to bottom.
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Fig. 8. (Colour on-line). Diversities and fitnesses ν1 of the two
populations as a function of the aspect ratio α (α1 = α
1/2, α2 =
α−1/2). Upper panels are for Γ = −0.5, lower panels for Γ = 0
(u1 = u2 = 1). Solid lines are P1, dot-dashed lines P2.
4.4 One-population models with heterogeneous
co-operation pressure
In this section we will consider a single-population replica-
tor model with heterogeneous (i.e. species-dependent) co-
operation pressures. Specifically consider N species sub-
ject to the replicator equations
x˙i = xi

−2uixi + N∑
j=1
wijxj − f

 , i = 1, . . . , N (13)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
c2
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
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diversity
payoff
Fig. 9. (Colour on-line). Effects of strategy correlations. c1 is
fixed to c1 = 0 as c2 is varied from 0 to 1. Fully anti-symmetric
(zero-sum) case Γ = −1. Co-operation pressures are u1 = u2 =
1. Results from the fixed-point ansatz are shown as solid lines,
markers are from simulations, with circles corresponding to
P1 and squares to P2 (N = 100, 10000 integration steps, 200
samples).
where the coupling matrix is a Gaussian random quantity
as in [7] (wij = 0, w2ij = 1/N,wijwji = Γ/N), but where
the co-operation pressure now carries a species index i,
and where each ui is assumed to be drawn independently
from the distribution ρ(u) at the beginning of the dynam-
ics and then remains fixed. Note that while the overall
concentration N−1
∑
i xi = 1 is conserved, species subject
to a certain (e.g. high) co-operation pressure may well die
out or be reduced in concentration to the advantage of
species of a lesser co-operation pressure.
The further analysis leads to an ensemble of effective
processes, one for each value of u in the support of ρ(u):
x˙u = xu
[
− 2uxu − Γ
∫
dt′G(t, t′)xu(t
′) + ηu(t)− f(t)
]
.
(14)
The response function is now defined as
G(t, t′) =
∫
duρ(u) 〈δxu(t)/δηu(t′)〉. Furthermore we have
〈ηu(t)ηu(t′)〉 =
∫
du′ρ(u′) 〈xu′(t)xu′ (t′)〉 independently of
u. A fixed point ansatz results in the following self-consistent
equations for the integrated response χ, the (inverse) di-
versity parameter q and the fitness f :
χ = g0(∆)
∫
du
ρ(u)
(2u− Γχ) ,
q−1/2 = g1(∆)
∫
du
ρ(u)
(2u− Γχ) ,
1 = g2(∆)
∫
du
ρ(u)
(2u− Γχ)2 , (15)
where ∆ = −f/√q. While we note that the fitnesses f of
any surviving species come out as equal (and independent
8 Tobias Galla: Two-population evolutionary dynamics
of their co-operation pressures), their relative concentra-
tions
C(u) =
1
|I(u)|
∑
i∈I(u)
xi (16)
and second moments
Q(u) =
1
|I(u)|
∑
i∈I(u)
x2i (17)
(suitable sample-averages are implied) maybe well be de-
pendent on u 2. Here I(u) denotes the set of species i ∈
{1, . . . , N} with co-operation pressure ui ∈ [u−du, u+du],
with du an infinitesimal element. Overall self-consistency
requires that
∫
duρ(u)C(u) = 1 and
∫
duρ(u)Q(u) = q.
We will here restrict to the case of a flat distribution
ρ(u) over the interval [µ − s, µ + s], so that the integrals
on the right-hand side of (15) can be performed explicitly
to give
χ = g0(∆)(4s)
−1 ln
[
2µ+ 2s− Γχ
2µ− 2s− Γχ
]
,
q−1/2 = g1(∆)(4s)
−1 ln
[
2µ+ 2s− Γχ
2µ− 2s− Γχ
]
,
1 =
g2(∆)
(2µ− Γχ)2 − 4s2 . (18)
Results are shown and compared with simulations in Fig.
10. Interestingly one observes a decline in diversity of the
population as the variability s of the co-operation pressure
is increased. Thus increasing the complexity of the prop-
erties of the individual species might lead to a less diverse
composition of the eco-system at stationarity. This effect
seems to be mostly independent of the symmetry of the
couplings3. The inset of Fig. 10 demonstrates that the
relative weight C(u) of species subject to co-operation u
decreases non-linearly with u, so that species with compa-
rably low co-operation pressure dominate the population
at the fixed point. More precisely C(u) is found to be
given by C(u) =
√
qg1(∆)/(2u − Γχ), i.e. it roughly de-
cays as the inverse power of u. As seen in the inset of the
figure the theoretical prediction of this behaviour agrees
perfectly with results from simulations.
5 Conclusions
In summary, we have extended existing generating func-
tional techniques to study the behaviour of two-population
replicator systems, and have focused on the effects of co-
operation pressure, relative population size and strategy
correlation. A phase transition between a stable phase
2 We here note that the fraction of survivors φ(u) =P
i∈I(u)Θ(xi) (with Θ(·) the step function) comes out as in-
dependent of u, and is given by φ(u) ≡ φ = g0(∆).
3 We have not been able to solve the resulting fixed-point
equations for Γ = 1 at large widths s of the distribution of
co-operation pressures.
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Fig. 10. (Colour on-line) One-population model with hetero-
geneous co-operation pressures. Main panel: diversity versus
variability of co-operation pressure (µ = 1 fixed). Upper curve
shows Γ = −1, lower curve Γ = 0. Symbols from simulations
(N = 300, 5000 integration steps, 10 samples). Inset: concen-
tration of sub-population with co-operation pressure u as a
function of u (Γ = 0, µ = 1, s = 0.5). Solid line is theory, noisy
line simulations (N = 300, 100 samples). Dashed line to the
lower right in main panel indicates unstable regime for Γ = 0
with one unique fixed point of the replicator dynamics
has been identified, and characterised analytically. This
phase is separated from a second unstable phase by a tran-
sition line in parameter space, which can be determined
from the statistical mechanics analysis. Our study demon-
strates that control parameters such as co-operation pres-
sure, aspect ratio and strategy correlation have non-trivial
effects on the the system of replicators, and can induce
non-monotonic behaviour of the resulting fitnesses. We
have also addressed single population models with species-
dependent co-operation pressure. The statistical mechan-
ics theory is then formulated in terms of an ensemble of
effective processes, one for each value of the co-operation
pressure present in the population. We find that variabil-
ity in the co-operation pressures reduces the diversity of
the set of surviving species. In such a mixed population,
the weight of species subject to a specific co-operation
pressure u scales as u−1 asymptotically.
Natural extensions of the present model include the
generalisation to a larger number of populations, and the
study of dynamics which is different from standard repli-
cator equations [1,2,23]. Furthermore, relatively little is
known about the non-ergodic phase of random replicator
systems, so that future work might address the proper-
ties of such phases. From the point of view of real-world
eco-systems and population dynamics the assumption of
a fully connected interaction matrix is at best a crude
approximation, and would ideally need to be replaced by
ensembles with sparse interactions. While the analysis of
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fully connected replicator models like the one discussed
in this paper, is relatively straightforward and leads to
an effective theory in terms of two-time quantities (the
correlation and response functions), dilute replicator sys-
tems pose a much more demanding challenge, as order
parameter equations do not close on the two-time level
[24]. Future work might hence address such models, po-
tentially relying on recently developed techniques to study
spin systems with sparse interaction matrices [25].
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